correct predictions on the filler trials, also responded to the crucial test trials in line with the relational information that was implied by the filler trials. More specifically, these participants predicted the outcome less often for target cues that were previously paired with the outcome (i.e., on IJ, O, and P test trials that followed I+, J+, and OP+ training trials) than for target cues that were never paired with the outcome during training (i.e., MN, K, and L test trials that followed M-, N-, and KL-training trials). According to propositional models of associative learning, participants used the relational information implied by the filler trials to form propositions about the relation between the test cues and the outcome. For instance, based on I+ and J+ trials, they formed the proposition that I and J together would not be followed by the outcome and therefore predicted that the compound IJ would not be followed by the outcome.
My colleagues and I replicated and extended these findings in a number of studies that were reported in two papers (De Houwer & Vandorpe, 2010; Zanon, Gast, & De Houwer, 2010; see Wills, Graham, Koh, McLaren, & Rolland, 2011 , for related studies). In a first study (De Houwer & Vandorpe, 2010) , we found an impact of the relational information that was implied by the filler trials even when knowledge about the target-cue outcome relations Propositional Learning 8 was assessed using an Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT is a reaction time task in which participants classify stimuli into one of four categories by pressing one of two keys.
The basic idea behind the IAT is that classification performance should be superior when the categories assigned to the same key are somehow related in memory than when they are unrelated (see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) . Because the IAT requires the use of four stimulus categories, we had to alter the design of Shanks and Darby (1998) slightly.
Rather than having one outcome that could be present or absent, we paired cues with one of two possible outcomes. More specifically, cues were said to be chemical substances that could either result in nausea or skin irritation. In a first between-subjects condition (Condition Same), filler cues were followed by the same outcome independent of whether they were presented in isolation or in compound (i.e., A-O1, B-O1, AB-O1, C-O2, D-O2, CD-O2, where different letters refer to different chemical substances, O1 refers to the first outcome, and O2 refers to the second outcome). In a second condition (Condition Opposite), cues were followed by a different outcome when presented in isolation than when presented in compound (i.e., A-O1, B-O1, AB-O2, C-O2, D-O2, CD-O1). During training, participants in both conditions saw the target compound EH together with O1 and the target compound GH with O2.
In Condition Same, the contextual relational information that was embedded in the filler trials allowed participants to infer that E would be followed by O1 when presented in isolation whereas G on its own would be followed by O2. Performance on the IAT confirmed that participants found it easier to respond when E and O1 were assigned to one key and G and O2 were assigned to the second key than when the key assignments were reversed (i.e., press one key for E and O2 and second key for G and O1). In Condition Opposite, however, the contextual relational information implied that E on its own would be followed by O2 and Propositional Learning 9 G on its own by O1 even though participants actually experienced trials on which E was paired with O1 and G was paired with O2. In line with the prediction of propositional models, IAT performance showed that participants found it easier to relate E with O2 and G with O1 than to relate E with O1 and G with O2. In sum, in Condition Opposite, associative learning did not reflect the actual target-cue pairings but the relational information that was embedded in the filler trials.
In a recent set of studies, my colleagues and I showed that associative learning of evaluations can also be moderated by contextual relational information (Zanon, De Houwer, & Ga st, 2012) . We implemented the same design as De Houwer and Vandorpe (2010) but used a positive and negative event as outcomes. More specifically, O1 corresponded to winning points whereas O2 corresponded to the loss of points. Hence, participants experienced events in which cue E co-occurred with winning (i.e., EF-win trials) and cue G co-occurred with losing (GH-loss trials). Across three different studies, we used three different reaction time measures that each provided an indirect index of how much participants liked the target cues E and G. In each study, we found that E was liked more than G in Condition Same. In Condition Opposite, however, no difference was found in the liking of E and G. Hence, the relational information provided by the filler trials moderated the impact of the stimulus pairings on the liking of the target cues. Nevertheless, the fact that the liking of E and G did not reverse in Condition Opposite provides a first indication that there are boundary conditions to the impact of contextual relational information on associative learning. The studies that are discussed in the next section shed some light on what those boundary conditions might be.
Verbal Instructions as a Context
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In the studies of Peters and Gawronski (2011) , participants were asked to form an impression of four previously unknown persons based on information about the traits of these persons. Pictures of Persons A and B were most often presented together with positive trait words whereas pictures of Persons C and D were most often paired with negative trait words.
Participants were told that the trait words gave a true description of Persons A and C (e.g., if
Person A was paired with the word FRIENDLY, it implied that Person A was friendly)
whereas Persons B and D possessed the traits that were opposite to those implied by the trait word (e.g., if Person B was presented with the word FRIENDLY, it implied that Person B was unfriendly). After this training phase, evaluations of the four target persons were assessed using both evaluative ratings and two indirect measurement tasks (i.e., the evaluative priming task and the affect misattribution task) that were designed to assess One might argue that the impact of contextual relational information on evaluative ratings is not particularly surprising given that participants had ample time to take into account the relational information provided by the instructions. It is important to note, however, that also automatic evaluations as captured by indirect measurement tasks were more negative for Person B than for Person D.
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In their third study, Peters and Gawronski (2011) discovered that the impact of verbal relational information depends on the time at which this information presented. If participants were told before the training phase which person-trait pairings were true and which should be reversed, then both the evaluative ratings and the automatic evaluations were in line with the relational information (i.e., A liked more than C but B liked less than D). If, however, participants first saw all person-trait pairings and were told only afterwards which pairings presented true information and which should be reversed, then automatic evaluations were influenced less by the relational information than evaluative ratings. More specifically, whereas participants rated A as more positive than C and B as less positive than D, automatic evaluations revealed a preference for A over C but no difference in the evaluation of B and D.
This finding also sheds some light on the results of Zanon et al. (2012) that were described in the previous section. They also found that contextual relational information eliminated but did not reverse the effect of stimulus pairings on automatic evaluations. The lack of a reversal might have been due to the fact that the relational information was carried by the filler trials which were scattered throughout the learning phase. Hence, the relational information probably became available only after at least some target-outcome pairings were presented.
In a conceptual replication of the third study of Peters and Gawrsonki (2011), my colleagues and I repeatedly paired one neutral nonword (e.g., LOKANTA -HAPPY) with an existing positive word and a second neutral nonword with an existing negative word (e.g., FEVKANI -UGLY; Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, in press, Experiment 1). Either before or after the pairings, participants were told that the nonwords were antonyms of the existing words, that is, that each nonword had the opposite meaning of the existing word with which it was paired. At the end of the experiment, automatic evaluations of the nonwords were captured using a version of the IAT. When the antonym instructions were presented before the nonword-word pairings, the impact of the nonword-word pairings was reversed (i.e., participants liked the nonword that was paired with the positive word less than the nonword that was paired with the negative word). In line with the findings of Peters and Gawronski, the effect of the stimulus pairings was merely attenuated but not reversed when the antonym instructions was presented after the pairings.
In a second study (Zanon et al., in press , Experiment 2), we tested one possible explanation for why the impact of relational information depends on the time at which that information is presented. Given that in daily life, stimuli that are somehow similar tend to cooccur more often than stimuli that are dissimilar, it might be the case that -in the absence of any other contextual relational information -the mere pairing of two stimuli is seen as a cue that those stimuli are somehow equivalent (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001 , for a discussion of this assumption). For instance, when participants see a picture of an unknown person together with a trait word (as was the case in the studies of Peters and Gawronski, 2011), they might infer that the trait word provides a true reflection of the properties of the depicted person. However, they will not draw these inferences if other relational information is available that contradicts the default assumption (e.g., the verbal message the persons possess the traits opposite to those implied by the trait words). When they receive this relational information only after the pairings, they can form new propositions about the target persons based on this new relational information but they cannot erase the propositions that they formed on the basis of the default assumption earlier on during the training phase. If one adds the final assumption that these initial propositions have a larger effect on automatic evaluations than on evaluative ratings (e.g., because the former are more difficult to control), one can explain the fact that relational information has less impact on automatic evaluations than on evaluative ratings if that information is presented only after the pairings.
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To test this idea, we presented verbal relational information both before and after the stimulus pairings. Participants could be told that the nonwords and words were either synonyms or antonyms, thus resulting in four conditions (i.e., synonym before and after, antonyms before and after, synonyms before and antonyms after, antonyms before and synonyms after). We also ran a condition in which verbal relational information was not provided, neither before nor after the pairings. As in earlier studies, we registered both evaluative ratings and automatic evaluations. In line with the account outlined above, automatic evaluations were influenced more strongly by the initial relational information than evaluative ratings. Moreover, results in the condition without any relational information were similar to those in the synonym-before-and-after condition, thus suggesting that in the absence of contradictory contextual relational information, mere stimulus pairings are seen as a cue for the equivalence of the paired stimuli.
A Functional-Cognitive Analysis of the Empirical Evidence
The studies described above are firmly rooted in the cognitive tradition of learning research. Within this cognitive approach, the main aim is to uncover the mental mechanisms that mediate (associative) learning, that is, the mechanisms by which regularities in the environment produce changes in behavior. For instance, the studies listed above were designed primarily to evaluate propositional models of associative learning. However, from a functional-cognitive perspective (De Houwer, 2011), cognitive and functional researchalthough driven by fundamentally different objectives -can be mutually supportive. On the one hand, cognitive research produces new functional knowledge (i.e., new knowledge about the conditions under which behavioral effects occur). On the other hand, functional research constrains cognitive theories because it generates functional knowledge that cognitive theories should be able to explain. In other words, cognitive theories can inspire the discovery Propositional Learning 14 of novel functional knowledge whereas functional research can provide additional input for the development of cognitive theories.
The cognitive and functional approach can, however, interact only to the extent that there is a common language to describe the research that each approach generates. Elsewhere, my colleagues and I proposed that this common language can be found in the functional approach. Hence, we have argued that cognitive researchers can benefit from describing in functional terms the behavioral effects that they examine and the data they generate (De Houwer, 2011; De Houwer et al., 2013; De Houwer et al., in press) . In this section, I will attempt to provide such a functional analysis of the cognitive studies that were described in the previous section. In doing so, I hope to clarify not only how this cognitive research contributes to the functional approach, but also how existing functional research can further constrain cognitive theories of associative learning.
In functional terms, studies on the impact of contextual relational information provide additional evidence for a phenomenon known as context dependent relational responding.
Consider the study by Steele and Hayes (1991) . During a first training phase, participants were shown a sample stimulus (e.g., a short line) together with two comparison stimuli (e.g., a short line and a long line), one of which was physically identical to the sample. In the presence of a first arbitrary relational cue (a meaningless symbol; i.e., cue SAME), participants were reinforced for selecting the comparison stimulus that was identical to the sample (e.g., the short line) whereas in the presence of a second relational cue (another meaningless symbol; i.e., cue OPPOSITE), the selection of the other stimulus was reinforced (e.g., the long line). The fact that participants were able to respond in the desired way could be seen as an example of context dependent non-arbitrary relational responding. Participants responded relationally in that their choices were based not on the properties of one stimulus Propositional Learning 15 as such (i.e., the identity of the short line) but on the relation between the identity of the sample and the identity of the comparison stimuli. Relational responding could have been non-arbitrary in that is was based on the physical properties of the stimuli. Most important for the present purposes, relational responding was context dependent in that a contextual cue (SAME or OPPOSITE) determined the type of relation that controlled the choices.
The study of Steele and Hayes (1991) did not end there. During a second training phase, sample and comparison stimuli were arbitrarily selected such that they did not (systematically) share any physical resemblance. The stimuli were randomly assigned to different arrays and were denoted by a letter-digit code in which the letter referred to the array to which the stimulus belonged and the digit referred to the location of the stimulus within the array (e.g., stimulus B2 refers to the second stimulus in array B). Importantly, when cue OPPOSITE was present, participants were reinforced for selecting B3 from an array of comparison stimuli in the presence of A1 and for selecting C3 from another array of comparison stimuli in the presence of A1. When relational cue SAME was present, however, B1 and C1 had to be selected in the presence of A1. During the crucial test trials, participants saw B3 as a sample stimulus and C1 and C3 as comparison stimuli. In the presence of the relational cue SAME, participants selected C3 whereas in the presence of relational cue OPPOSITE, participants selected C1 even though participants had never been reinforced for making these choices. These results demonstrate that participants responded relationally (i.e., because the choices were not based merely on one stimulus but on the relation between the sample and comparison stimuli) in a way that was context dependent (because relational responding was dependent on the context cue) and based on arbitrary stimulus properties (because the stimuli did not share any systematic physical relation). This behavioral phenomenon is commonly referred to as arbitrarily applicable relational responding (see Dymond & Roche, 2013, and Hayes et al., 2001 , for relevant reviews).
1
The cognitive studies on the impact of contextual relational information that were described in the second section of this paper share important features with study of Steele and
Hayes. Most importantly, responding in the cognitive studies was most likely relational in nature. Consider the study of Peters and Gawronski (2011) Assume, for instance, that a stimulus person acquires the valence that is implied by the contextual meaning of the trait word with which it is paired (e.g., the trait word " happy" in the context of the relational cue "false" might be recoded as "sad", thus leading to a disliking of persons paired with the trait word "happy"). Although this account implies context dependent relational responding to the trait word, the change in responding to the stimulus person might still be considered as non-relational (see Zanon et al., in press, for a discussion).
One way to argue against such a non-relational account of the results of Peters and Gawronski would be to test whether the changes in evaluative responding to a person transfer to stimuli that were not paired with the trait words but that do participate in relation with that person (e.g., that the same changes occur for friends of that person but opposite changes occur for enemies of that person; see Smyth, Barnes-Holmes, & Forsyth, 2006 , ValdiviaSalas, Dougher, & Luciano, 2013 , and Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2004 , for more details about this approach). Regardless of the outcomes of this additional research, it seems at least reasonable to raise the possibility that cognitive studies on the impact of contextual relational information provide new evidence for the functional phenomenon of (arbitrarily applicable) relational responding. Moreover, cognitive studies could inspire functional researchers to engage in quasi-replications of these studies using training and testing methods that provide more control over the learning history that participants bring to bear during the experiment.
In sum, cognitive research could contribute to the functional literature on associative learning in different ways.
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By linking the cognitive studies on contextual relational information to the functional phenomenon of relational responding, it also becomes apparent that existing functional research on relational responding could be relevant for the development of cognitive theories of associative learning. In order to explain the fact that humans can respond on the basis of relations between stimuli and can do so in a context dependent manner, it seems necessary to assume that the cognitive mechanisms that mediate these behavioral effects somehow process information about the way in which stimuli are related. In other words, evidence for context dependent relational responding supports the hypothesis that propositions mediate associative learning. In any case, current or future cognitive theories of associative learning should be able to account for context dependent (non-arbitrary or arbitrarily applicable) relational responding. Because of the unfortunate divide between functional and cognitive approaches in psychology, this challenge has rarely if ever been addressed by cognitive models of associative learning. In sum, cognitive research on associative learning can benefit from venturing into the functional domain just like functional research can profit from cognitive research.
Conclusion
As is evidenced by the papers reported in this special issue, the effects of context on associative learning have been studied extensively. The present paper highlights a number of studies on the impact of contextual relational information that were inspired by propositional models of human associative learning. From the perspective of propositional models, contextual relational information should play a vital role in associative learning because it shapes the propositions that are thought to mediate learning. Various studies confirmed that contextual relational information moderates associative learning, irrespective of whether relational information was embedded in other regularities or in verbal instructions. In some Propositional Learning 19 cases, effects of stimulus pairings were even reversed as the result of the presence of contextual relational cues. These findings do not only support propositional models of associative learning but also contribute to the functional literature by providing new evidence for arbitrarily applicable relational responding. Vice versa, existing functional research on relational responding can inform cognitive research about the mental mechanisms that mediate associative learning. Research on the impact of contextual relational cues is thus likely to provide fertile common ground for both cognitive and functional scholars of associative learning.
